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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency performance of the Gulf Cooperation
Countries (GCC) banking sector. The primary focus is to assess whether market power, risk taking
activities, and regulations have significant effects on GCC banks’ efficiency performance.
Design/methodology/approach – The estimation and inference has been implemented using a
double bootstrap procedure that simultaneously corrects for bias and validates inference on the
influence of covariates. In the first stage, efficiency scores are estimated with data envelopment
analysis (DEA). In the second stage, variation in the resulting efficiency scores is explained using a
truncated regression model with inference based on a semi-parametric bootstrap routine.
Findings – The authors found compelling evidence that efficiency is not independent of the market
structure, the bank’s risk taking activities, and the regulatory environment. In particular, the Lerner
Index provides evidence that market power decreases efficiency. The capital adequacy, the supervisory
power and the market discipline were all found to improve efficiency. Additionally, when the risk
is measured by the Z-Score or even by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, it adversely
affects efficiency.
Research limitations/implications – The results of the current study have important implications
for regulators and supervisors. Promoting banks’ competitive environment in the GCC countries
through reducing the information barriers to entry, encouraging bank privatization, and lowering the
activities restrictions can potentially improve operational efficiency of banks. Also enhancing banks’
diversification activities and risk management techniques may have the advantage of increasing
operational efficiency. Furthermore, improvements in the regulatory conditions that enhance banking
supervision and monitoring would also improve efficiency.
Originality/value – The main contributions of the paper are threefold: first, to the knowledge, this
study is the first to employ by far the most comprehensive data set of GCC banks investigated to date.
Second, the analysis focusses on the influence of a wide set of factors, most of them was not covered
before in related economic literature on bank efficiency of the GCC countries. Third, the methodological
innovation involves applying a double bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).
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1. Introduction
The spread of the financial crisis originating in the USA has revealed an increased
inter-connectedness between financial markets and institutions. Many banks around
the globe have failed, and banking sector profits plummeted. The financial turmoil has
necessitated a major revision of policies and regulations related to deregulation,
competition, and capital adequacy. The survival of banks in the current deregulated,
free, open, and competitive markets depends on their performance and efficiency.
Hence, the information on efficiency in financial institutions provides insights for bank
management to improve performance. For instance, the knowledge on the influence
of various risk-taking activities, diversification, size, and liquidity may be useful in
revising policies that aim to improve performance and efficiency.
Following the recent global financial crisis, bank efficiency and exposures to
external shocks were brought to the forefront in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (the
GCC hereinafter)[1]. For instance, shortly after the global financial meltdown in August
2008, the Central Bank of Kuwait halted trading in the shares of the Gulf Bank,
and appointed an auditor to monitor operations, after the bank suffered big losses in
foreign currency derivative contracts. As banks were vulnerable, a sequence of events
and policies to protect has also been followed. For instance, to shield against a run on
banks, both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait moved to guarantee deposits.
Moreover, the authorities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE pumped liquidity into the
banking system to alleviate the liquidity stress in financial markets. In the meantime,
Qatar has invested in its banks’ stocks. The sequence of events did not stop, and a year
after came the default of two large business groups in Saudi Arabia and the Dubai’s
debt crisis. All these events have raised doubts regarding potential problems and
failures that may emerge in the banking sector and motivate a study of the determinants
of efficiency in the GCC countries.
In this paper, we test the significance of traditional factors that may influence bank
efficiency in the GCC countries. Our paper is supposed to fill a geographical gap in
terms of the nature of association between a large group of variables and bank efficiency.
Thus, our analysis is not restricted, and it covers a wide range of explanatory variables
that was not investigated before in GCC banks. The previous literature on bank efficiency
in the GCC is scant, and its main interest lies on measuring efficiency[2]; as opposed to
investigating the determinants of efficiency, as we do in this paper. The only study found
that established formally a relationship between market structure and efficiency is
Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009). However, this study did not control for some other
relevant variables such as market discipline and supervisory power, and it used an
inaccurate measure to estimate efficiency. The inference in this study is conducted in two
steps: measuring efficiency in the first step; regression and inference on the determinants
in the second step[3].
The two step methodology used in this paper to measure efficiency employs a
double bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar andWilson (2007) to ensure consistency of
efficiency scores and estimated parameters. The procedure is applied to the truncated
regression that uses the DEA measure. The first bootstrap draws efficiency simulates
using the truncated regression results[4], and Monte Carlo draws from its innovations.
These simulates are used to compute bias-corrected and consistent estimates of banks
efficiency, that are then used (backwards) to re-generate simulated estimates of covariate
parameters and their standard errors. The Monte Carlo experiments of Simar and Wilson
(2007) have shown that the performance of this procedure is superb in terms of the
coverage of the estimated confidence interval of efficiency, and of other slope parameters
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of the truncated regression. In contrast to that, the plain vanilla two stage truncated
procedure results were found to be catastrophic.
Our results clearly show that examined factors were strongly significant.
Specifically, we found compelling evidence that efficiency is not independent of the
market structure, the bank’s risk taking activities, and the regulatory environment.
Furthermore, the capital adequacy, the supervisory power and the market discipline
were all found to improve efficiency. Finally, when the risk is measured by the
Z-Score or even by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, it adversely affects
efficiency.
The paper now proceeds as follows. The second section provides a brief background
on the main bank efficiency determinants and surveys the related literature. Section 3
outlines the methodology used to measure efficiency and infer its relation with covariates.
The fourth section describes the covariates included and their measurement. The details
of the data set and the empirical results are included in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
contains some concluding remarks.
2. Background and related literature review
The literature on banking efficiency is extensive. Dating back to Hicks (1935)
seminal article, it is well documented that greater market power is associated
with deteriorating efficiency (for recent evidence see Casu and Girardone, 2006;
Berger and Hannan, 1997; Delis and Tsionas, 2009; Fenn et al., 2008; Turk-Ariss, 2010).
The quiet life hypothesis of Hicks (1935) argues that under monopoly, the manager tends
to relax, and to waste some economic profits through discretionary expenses. Similarly,
and along the same lines, is the threat of liquidation hypothesis of Leibenstein (1966),
which claims that increased competition may heighten pressures to reduce slack and
increase efficiency.
The Hicks (1935) and the Leibenstein (1966) hypotheses stands in marked contrast
to the relative market power hypothesis of Demsetz (1974), which emphasizes that
bank market power is positively related to efficiency. The economies of scale and
scope, the reduced funding costs, and savings in monitoring and assessment were all
cited as factors expected to promote efficiency. The empirical evidence that supports
this hypothesis is still scarce. For instance, Pruteanu-Podpiera and Weill (2008) have
examined the effect of market power on efficiency in the Czech Republic, and found
that greater market power is associated with greater efficiency. A similar story can be
found in Maudos and DeGuevara (2007) for the case of the Spanish banking sector.
These findings are serious as they raise skepticism regarding policies that aim at
enhancing competition in the banking industry.
Another well-established fact is the effect of regulation and supervision environments
on bank efficiency. This was investigated by Barth et al. (2004) who examined (among
abroad range of other variables) capital adequacy, supervisory power[5], and market
discipline. Their hypothesis assumes that increased capital requirement will reduce
lending, enhance loan quality, and decrease monitoring costs. Supporting empirical
evidence were the works of Pasiouras (2008a, b), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), and
Barth et al. (2013). However, the results of Barth et al. (2004) himself were skeptical since
no significant relation between capital and efficiency was recorded (see also Pasiouras
et al., 2009; Delis et al., 2009, for similar skeptical evidence).
Moreover, Barth et al. (2004) showed that supervision effect was also weak, and that
only those regulations which ensure accurate disclosure were effective. They claimed
that failures in the banking market is a low-frequency event, and that the government
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failure to correct is almost inevitable. Their empirical evidence is also consistent with
that theory, and they concluded that empowering private monitoring, and market
discipline would be more effective than relying on government intervention. The
supporting literature of their findings includes Barth et al. (2006, 2007), Pasiouras
(2008a, b), Delis et al. (2009), Pasiouras et al. (2009), Uchida and Satake (2009), Lozano-
Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), and Barth et al. (2013).
On the other hand, under the Beck et al. (2003, 2006) version, official supervision
enhances corporate governance and boosts efficiency. Contrary to their hypothesis,
Beck et al. (2003, 2006) empirical results indicate that the relation between
supervision and efficiency is weak. However, some supporting evidence of their version
of the story can be found in Pasiouras (2008a, b), Chortareas et al. (2012), and Barth
et al. (2013).
In addition to regulation, a factor that has received increasing attention in recent
years was risk taking. The relation between bank risk taking and efficiency has been
the focus of Berger and DeYoung (1997). Under the bad management hypothesis,
additional monitoring costs associated with increased risk exposure of banks reduces
efficiency. Similarly, the bad luck hypothesis expects efficiency to deteriorate in the
aftermath of economic shocks due to dispersed management efforts and troubled loans.
The evidence of the effect of risk on efficiency can be found in Berger and De Young
(1997), Berger and Mester (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Sun and Chang (2011),
Fiordelisia et al. (2011), and Chortareas et al. (2011). In these studies, a negative
relationship was significant, and has been explained by the fact that poor performance
is more likely to be associated with poor risk management. However, approval of these
results is not universal. For instance, the skimping hypothesis predicts a positive
relationship between risk and efficiency in the short run. The empirical evidence
consistent with this hypothesis includes among others Isik and Hassan (2003), and
Havrylchyk (2006).
3. Methodology
This paper uses DEA to calculate efficiency values. One of the well-known advantages
of the DEA method is that it allows us to compare banking markets of different size
with respect to a common frontier, and without imposing any specific parametric
functional form. Hence, the DEA does not pre-specify a production technology. This is
serious as we do not have to deal with any possible misspecications due to
inappropriate functional form (see Pasiouras, 2008b). Moreover, in the DEAwe do not
need long time series data to carry out estimation compared to other parametric
frontier methods such as the stochastic frontier analysis, the thick frontier approach,
and/or the distribution free approach[6].
The DEA can be implemented using either an input or an output orientation. In the
input orientation approach, the objective is to estimate the degree of potential input
savings for a given realized output level of the unit (Bougnol et al., 2010). However,
under the output-orientation, we measure the extent to which output may have
been expanded for the level of inputs used by the unit. To date, the theoretical literature
in this field is somewhat inconclusive and controversial as to the best choice among
the alternative orientations of measurement[7]. Following the most recent banking
literature (e.g. Casu and Girardone, 2006; Delis, 2009; Chortareas et al., 2012; Barth
et al., 2013), we chose the input-orientation model since banks are typically focussed
on cost control rather than on output during transitional periods and following
substantial reforms.
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Due to space constraints, a short description of the DEA is given here[8]. Assume
that y^i is the efficiency estimate[9] of bank i, that can be obtained by solving a linear
programming problem of the type:
y^i ¼ min
y^il
y40
Xn
i¼1
xkilipy^ixk; 8k;
Xn
i¼1
ymiliX ym; 8m;
Xn
i¼1
li  1; lX0; 8i;

( )
ð1Þ
where xi and yi denotes the sample input and output vectors, respectively, and n refers
to the number of banks in the sample. Note also that li is an nX1 vector of weights that
sums to one. The vector forms a convexity constraint that ensures comparison against
the same size. It also allows for variable returns to scale. The inference about the
determinants of bank efficiency is derived by regressing the estimated efficiency scores
in (1) on relevant explanatory variables using censored regression models[10].
This approach allows for the measurement of the combined effects and for testing the
significance of various factors.
Despite its wide use, this inference procedure is subject to a number of drawbacks.
First, efficiency estimates obtained in (1) are biased. Although the DEA measure rules
out the possibility that the true frontier lies below the constructed frontier, it may still
lie above, especially when the more efficient regions of the frontier are not covered by
the sample points. Second, the two-stage procedure depends on factors that were not
accounted for in estimating efficiency. This implies that the efficiency estimates in (1)
are serially correlated. This is serious, as inference on the basis of inconsistent and
correlated measure is invalid. Hence, in this paper we use a double bootstrap procedure
that corrects the bias in efficiency scores, and takes into account the potential endogeneity
problem caused by the omitted variable bias and the relationship between bank efficiency
and its determinants through the use of the truncated regression. For more details
information on this procedure see Simar and Wilson (2007 pp. 41-42)[11].
To date, the literature is inconclusive as to the proper definition and measures of
inputs and outputs that has to be used in the production frontiers. Most studies,
however, have followed either the production approach or the intermediation
approach[12]. The production approach considers banks as producers of services that
perform transactions on deposit accounts and process documents such as loans.
Accordingly, it defines banks’ inputs as the number of employees and physical capital;
and outputs as number of accounts or its related transactions[13]. The intermediation
approach on the other hand considers that banks mainly mobilize funds from savers to
investors. In particular, banks collect purchased funds (deposits) and use labor and
physical capital to transform these funds into interest-earning loans and other assets.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that the intermediation approach may be more
appropriate for evaluating entire banks than the production approach, as it normally
takes interest expense into account, which is a large proportion of a bank’s total costs.
Furthermore, they point out that the intermediation approach may be superior for
evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency to the profitability of banks since
minimization of total costs (not just production costs) is needed to maximize profits.
The review of the previous studies indicates that the intermediation approach is the
most commonly used one[14]. Following these studies, we follow the “intermediation
approach” for our estimation of banking efficiency. Accordingly, four inputs are
considered; total deposits; interest expenses; operational expenses (non-interest
expenses) net of personnel expenses; and personnel expenses[15]. On the output side,
we used also four variables; performing loan[16]; other earning assets; interest revenue;
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and non-interest revenue. While the first three outputs are fairly standard in the
literature, the forth variable is included to control for the impact of non-traditional
banking activities as in Isik (2008), Das and Ghosh (2009), Barth et al. (2013), among
many others[17].
All data were deflated by the consumer price index and converted into constant
2001 dollars. Panel A of Table I shows a summary of statistics of the input and the
output variables.
To examine the impact on bank efficiency, we estimate the following truncated
panel specification:
y^it ¼b0 þ b1Riskit þ b1Powerit þ
Xn
k¼1
ykRegkt þ
Xn
k¼1
ykStructurekt
þ
Xn
k¼1
WktXk; it þ
Xn
k¼1
WkEcokt þ jDtþeit; eit ¼ vi þ uit
ð2Þ
where y^it is the technical efficiency of bank i in period t. The disturbance term, e consists of
a fixed effect vi, and an identically and independently distributed idiosyncratic error term,
uit. The variables, Risk and MARP represent the bank risk-taking and the bank-specific
market power proxies, respectively. Reg is time-dependent indices of bank regulation
common to all banks in each country. We also include a set of control variables. Structure
is the set of control variables that represents the market structure common to all banks in
each country. X is a vector of bank-level variables reflecting the characteristics of each
bank. The Eco variables are a vector that controls for the macroeconomic environment
common to all banks in each country. Finally, the specification includes the dummy
variable D. This variable is expected to capture the influence of the recent global nancial
crisis. Following is a description of the measurement of these variables Table II[18].
4. Measuring determinants of bank efficiency
To estimate the degree of market power, we use the Lerner index. The index measures the
distance between the price and marginal cost. The Lerner index is the markup of output
price above marginal cost, and it is therefore used as an indicator of the degree of market
power. The Lerner index measure is defined as Lernerit ¼ Pqit MCit=Pqit ; where Pitq, and
MCjt are the price of output and marginal cost of bank i at time t, respectively[19].
Following Maudos and DeGuevara (2007), Turk-Ariss (2010), and Agoraki et al.
(2011), among many others we estimate marginal cost from a Translog frontier cost
function. In that function, the total costs depend on the prices of three inputs: labor,
physical capital, and funds. It also depends on the bank’s output (measured as total
earning assets) and trend. Specifically, we use the bank-level panel data for each
country to estimate the following Trans log cost function:
LnCit ¼a0 þ a1lnqit þ 1
2
a2lnðqitÞ2 þ
X3
k¼1
bkt lnWk;it þ
1
2
X3
k¼1
X3
j¼1
bk;it lnWk;it lnwj;it
þ 1
2
X3
k¼1
dk lnqit lnWk;it þ m1Trend þ
1
2
m2Trend
2 þ m3Trend ln qit
þ
X3
k¼1
rkTrend lnWk;it þ tit; tit ¼ oi þ Bit
ð3Þ
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where Cit is the total cost (financial and operating) of bank i at time t. Note that qit refers
to the total assets. Also the variablesW1,it,W2,it,W3,it are, respectively, the cost of labor,
the cost of physical capital, and the cost of loanable funds. The cost of labor is
measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets[20]. The ratio of operating
expenses (net of labor cost) to fixed assets is used to proxy the cost of physical capital.
The interest expense to total deposits was used to compute the cost of loanable
funds. Panel B of Table I, presents summary statistics of the variables used to estimate
the Trans log cost function. We include a time dummy variable (Trend ) to capture
the effect of technical changes, as well as any effects of omitted trending variables. The
disturbance term tit includes an unobserved bank-specific effect oi, and an idiosyncratic
error Bit. The Equation (2) is estimated using the generalized method of moments[21].
Once Equation (2) is estimated, the marginal cost may be computed as:
MCit ¼ Cit
qit
a1 þ a2lnqit þ
X3
k¼1
bkt lnwk;it þ m3Trend
"
ð4Þ
The regulatory environment is summarized using four variables; capital requirement,
the power of the supervisory agencies, market discipline, and activity restrictions.
The variables above are measured using ready indices that exist in the World Bank
database. The World Bank database was developed by Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008).
Each index corresponds to one of the regulatory variables, and its value can be
obtained by summing the number of positive answers (or negative answers) of a pre-
defined relevant qualitative question set. The question set describes the various
dimensions of the related variable. For instance, the questions on capital requirement,
relates to its consistency with Basel II, the deductions before computing regulatory
capital, and the sources of funds that may be used as capital. Similarly, for other variables
there is another set of related questions. Additional information on the computation of
these indices is available on the World Bank web site[22].
We proxy the risk-taking behavior of banks using two alternative measures; the
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) and the Z-Score. The first measure
reflects the current credit risk of the bank. As banks improve their screening,
assessment and monitoring activities, the quality of written assets improves and
efficiency increases. The second measure is the Z-Score, which is defined as
ROAi þ CAPi=sROAi , where ROAi and sROAi are the average and the standard
deviation of returns on assets and CAPi is the equity ratio. The standard deviation
(volatility) of ROA is estimated as a three-year moving average. The score above is
monotonically related to the default risk of the bank. In particular, the wider the equity
base, the higher and more certain the bank’s profitability, the greater the value of the
index and the less likely default is[23]. Panel C of Table I, presents summary statistics
of the inputs used to compute the Z-Score.
In addition to the variables described above, we incorporate market-specific
(Structurekt), bank-specific (Xk,it), andmacroeconomic variables (Ecokt) that are expected to
impact bank efficiency[24]. First, we control for cross-country differences in the market
structure using the following two variables: the degree of foreign ownership, and
the degree of government ownership. These variables were measured by the fraction of
the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50 percent or more government owned
(public ownership), and the fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50
percent or more (foreign ownership).
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Second, at the bank level, we control for five bank characteristics. The size is
controlled for by using the log of bank total assets. The square of the size variable was
also included in the regressions to control for any existing non-linear relation with
efficiency. The bank’s profitability is controlled by including the return on assets.
For controlling the level of intermediation, we use the ratio of loans to total assets.
The bank capital was controlled for by capital adequacy ratio, which is computed
as the book value of shareholder’s equity to total assets[25]. Finally, diversification is
measured by the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income.
Third, we control for the general economic conditions by including two variables:
GDP growth and inflation rates. The GDP growth is used as a proxy for the phase of
business cycle. The economic cyclicality may affect the short-term efficiency of banks.
For instance, as aggregate income expands, profitability ratios improve, the probability
of default drops, and the bank is expected to show improved efficiency. Similarly,
inflation is considered to have negative impact on the medium and the long-term
contracts of the bank. Finally, to control for the effect of the recent global financial
crisis, we include a dummy variable takes on values of 1 for crisis years (2007-2008)
and 0 otherwise.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1 Data set
The sample is composed of annual observations that cover all the GCC countries.
The bank data set was obtained from Bank Scope database provided by Fitch-
IBCA[26]. In the sample, we include all the banks in the database that have ten years of
data available between 2000 and 2009. The filtered sample includes 70 banks. All data
were deflated with the consumer price index to convert into real, in constant 2001
dollars. The data of the regulatory indices was obtained from the World Bank
databases on Bank Regulation and Supervision[27]. In particular, we get the indices for
2000 by using the 2001 database, and we obtain the indices for the years 2001-2004,
from the 2003 database, and finally we use for the years from 2005 to 2009, the 2007
database. The data for the macroeconomic variables were collected from the International
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
5.2 Efficiency estimates
We estimate the banks’ efficiency scores relative to a common best-practice frontier
by pooling the data across countries. Table III presents the bootstrap efficiency
estimates of each of the GCC countries from 2000 to 2009[28].
As can be seen in the table, the average efficiency for all countries over the study
period was 86 percent. This level of efficiency compares nicely with the levels reported
by previous studies that covered the GCC (see Turk-Ariss et al., 2007; Ramanathan,
2007; Mustafa, 2007; Srairi, 2010). It is also close to the level of efficiency measured for
North American and European banks (see Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2008; Siriopoulos and
Tziogkidis, 2010; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Chortareas et al., 2013). However,
it is higher than the levels reported for developing and transition economies’ banks (see
Isik and Hassan, 2003; Kyj and Isik, 2008; Pasiouras, 2008b; Delis, 2009; Sufian, 2009;
Hsiao et al., 2010; Staub et al., 2010; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011).
Table III also clearly indicates that efficiency has increased until 2003. The average
efficiency in 2003 was around 92 percent. This was not surprising, as during that
period the GCC countries implemented significant financial reforms, which aimed
at promoting financial markets, and increasing competition. The macroeconomic
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stability, and the removal of interest rate controls, may have also contributed to
improved technical efficiency during the period. Following 2003, efficiency
deteriorated. The drop marked clearly the years: 2004, 2005, and 2006. The
economic environment in these years was characterized by high inflation[29], which
may have caused fluctuations and instability in factor prices. Add also to that the
increase in risk appetite as reflected by the big expansion in credit. Moreover, banks
have also invested heavily in technology during the period, and this may have forced
efficiency to drop[30]. The efficiency level reached 84 percent in 2006.
The drop in efficiency has continued to the years 2007 and 2008. Compared to the
2006 levels, the 2007 were 10 percent less. This may be attributed to the credit crunch
that followed the global financial crisis. The adverse impact of the financial crisis
on bank efficiency was more pronounced in 2008, where efficiency fell by another 12
percent. On the contrary, the 2009 efficiency estimates demonstrated substantial
recovery and increased by 5 percent. This implies that the devastating impact of the
global crisis was absorbed in 2009, and that the banking sector has started to recover.
These estimates also appear to be in line with recorded banks recovery in other parts of
the world during 2009 (for instance see Siriopoulos and Tziogkidis, 2010; Banker et al.,
2010; Manlagnit, 2011).
5.3 Summary statistics of key variables
Table IV, Panel A, reports the mean and the standard error for each of the variables
used in the model. The table shows that the explanatory variables significantly differ
among individual countries. The Saudi and Qatari banks are the most efficient.
The estimated efficiency is 91 percent and 89 percent for both countries, respectively.
In contrast, the Bahrain banks were the least efficient in the sample with an estimated
efficiency of 81 percent. The average ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was
5.02 percent for the whole of the GCC region. Its country value ranges from 3.9 percent
in the case of Oman, to 12.4 percent in Bahrain. The relatively high ratio of
non-performing loans points to the poor quality of underwritten loans in the GCC
countries. This may be confirmed by the Z-Score, which indicates higher risk
compared to developed, developing, and transitional economies. The average Z-Score
stands at 1.698 for the whole region, which is higher than that observed in either
transitional or developing countries (see Turk-Ariss, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011).
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
2000 85.36140 90.66814 89.03085 83.44465 92.16120 81.47799
2001 87.75537 90.34520 91.60666 89.61684 94.07403 92.00292
2002 98.22664 90.32153 98.20643 95.45579 98.95518 95.24164
2003 96.43715 84.34558 96.42711 92.34568 96.65488 91.39029
2004 82.36709 90.18582 93.00247 91.42680 92.06667 92.05141
2005 77.95399 87.83153 88.70509 90.35714 90.56563 86.32908
2006 81.46725 85.89634 83.03674 90.26636 89.93887 84.10470
2007 75.02899 81.92992 80.31038 90.85997 89.05457 85.37164
2008 53.63552 76.06607 74.48264 82.73199 81.60383 74.56463
2009 72.23067 82.43436 68.91655 83.33761 82.77205 78.07425
Notes: Technically efficient (TE) DEA scores estimated based on the output-oriented approach.
Efficiency scores were estimated using the double bootstrap procedure introduced by Simar and
Wilson (2007) with 2,000 bootstrap draws
Table III.
Average bootstrap
efficiency scores
2000 and 2009
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The Lerner index indicates that the banking market in the GCC is not competitive.
Its average for the whole of the GCC was 43.7 percent. However, it showed a significant
variation; from 31.6 to 78.8 percent for both Kuwait and Bahrain, respectively. Panel B
of Table IV, reports the annual Lerner index of the GCC countries. Table IV also
includes the indices used to proxy the regulatory environment. These indices show
some variations across countries. The capital requirements index ranges between 3.67
and 6.73 for Bahrain and Oman, respectively. Compared to the whole region (the value
is 5.09) the capital requirements are more stringent in Oman than in Bahrain. The
supervisory power and the market discipline indices were relatively similar across
countries. However, the activity restrictions index showed that the banking activities in
countries like Qatar and Oman is relatively restricted, when compared to either the
UAE, or the whole of the GCC region.
The ownership structure is also reported in Table IV. The numbers show that 20.3
percent of the GCC banking system is owned by foreigners. The foreign ownership in
the GCC during the period of the study was as follows: 60.7 percent in Bahrain, 27
percent in the UAE, 15.3 percent in Oman, 10.35 percent in Saudi Arabia, 7.45 percent
in Qatar, and there is no foreign owned banks in Kuwait. Table V also shows that 16.1
percent of the GCC banking sector is owned by the government. The government
ownership across countries was as follows: 45.1 percent in Qatar, 35 percent in the
UAE, 13.7 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 2.8 percent in Bahrain. There were no banks
owned by the government in Oman and Kuwait.
5.4 Analysis of the determinants of efficiency
The inference on efficiency determinants is based on the parameters and the t-values
of the truncated regression, that was bootstrapped using the double algorithm.
In particular, we implemented the bootstrap algorithm to estimate four nested models.
The results are presented in Table IV. The table reports regression results derived
from the estimation of five models.
The first column (Model 1) presents the basic regression model that includes market
power (the Lerner index) and it’s squared, the bank regulatory and supervisory
variables (the capital requirement; the supervisory power; the market discipline; and
the activity restrictions), the risk-taking variable (the ratio of non-performing loans to
total loans, NPL), the other bank characteristics control variables (size and its squared;
profitability measured by the return on assets; intermediation measured by the ratio of
loans to total asset; capitalization measured by the book value of equity to total assets;
and diversification measured by the ratio of non-interest income to operating income).
Model 2 adds the percentage of foreign ownership, and government ownership, to the
first model. Model 3 accounts for the effect of economic condition, the GDP growth and
inflation rates. Model 4 is the biggest model and it includes all variables plus a dummy
that captures the recent global financial crisis. The last four models (Models 5-8)
correspond to re-estimating Models 1-4 using the Z-Score instead the risk of insolvency.
Our results indicate that the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) is
negatively related to efficiency at the 5 percent significant level. The results are robust
to the risk measure. Models 5-8 use the Z-Score instead, and report similar results.
Particularly, it is found that the effect of the Z-Score on bank efficiency is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level, meaning that a bank with lower probability to default
(i.e. less risk taking) is more efficient than its peers. Similar empirical evidence on the
relation between risk and efficiency was provided by Berger and DeYoung (1997),
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Delis (2009), Sun and Chang (2011), Fiordelisia et al. (2011),
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Chortareas et al. (2011, 2012). These studies have pointed out the negative influence of
risk taking activities on bank efficiency.
The evidence on the relation between risk and efficiency is enough to support the
bad management hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997). The hypothesis refers to
the reduced efficiency following an increase in risk taking activity, due to additional
costs of managing troubled loans and monitoring performance. It also blends well
with the bad luck hypothesis that tries to explain inefficiency in terms of dispersed
managerial efforts in the aftermath of unexpected bad economic conditions. However,
these findings stand at marked distance from the skimping hypothesis that expects a
positive relationship between risk taking and efficiency over the short run. According
to this hypothesis, if banks choose to allocate fewer resources to monitoring loans, it
may appear to be more efficient due to the drop in its operating expenses.
The role of market power was also negative and significant at conventional levels.
Table V shows that the parameters associated with the levels, and the squares, of the
Lerner index were all negative and significant. The relation between bank market
power and efficiency is negative and non-linear. In order to determine the type of the
relation, we computed the inflection point of each of the quadratic models in Table V,
and compared it with the distribution of the data. For instance, the inflection point of
Model 1 was 0.5735, which covers approximately the second percentile of the Lerner
index distribution. This implies that more than 98 percent of market power data lies
above the inflection point.
The result on the effect of market power validates the quiet life hypothesis of Hicks
(1935). The hypothesis argues that greater market power is associated with less
managerial effort. Similarly, it stands well close to Leibenstein (1966), who claimed that
inefficiencies are eliminated by increased competition. According to his threat of
liquidation hypothesis, an increase in competition provides a direct incentive for
managers to increase efforts to operate closely to their production frontier, and also
provides the principals with relevant information to monitor the agents’ activities.
However, our results stand contrary to the Demsetz (1974) relative power hypothesis,
which predicts a reverse causality between competition and efficiency.
From the recent evidence, we contradict Maudos and DeGuevara (2007), who
reported evidence on the EU banking sector. However, we are consistent with Berger
and Hannan (1997), Fenn et al. (2008), Casu and Girardone (2006) and Delis and Tsionas
(2009) who provided results on the US and the EU markets. We are also in line with the
findings of Turk-Ariss (2010) on developing economies. All these studies have reported
a negative relationship between market power and efficiency.
The theoretical prediction as well as the empirical evidence on the effect of the
stringency of capital requirements is mixed. For instance, higher capital proportions
may reduce bank lending and the associated costs and hence, increase efficiency.
However, a higher capital proportion may raise the funding cost as capital is expensive,
and this may adversely affect efficiency. Moreover, as the capital requirement against
loans becomes stringent, banks arbitrage by investing in different asset classes which
may in turn affect their efficiency.
As can be seen in Table V, the capital requirement variable was found to have a
positive significant effect on efficiency. A strict capital standard may have substantial
positive influence on the efficiency of banks in the GCC countries. This result
supports the arguments that higher capital requirements may result in lowering the
probability of bankruptcy, improving the information availability, which in turn
increases the efficient operation of banks (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006;
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Chortareas et al., 2012). Similar evidence on the effect of capital was found in
Pasiouras (2008a, b), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), Barth et al. (2013)[31].
Contradicting evidence was reported by Barth et al. (2004), Pasiouras et al. (2009), Delis
et al. (2009).
The effect of supervisory power on efficiency was also positive, suggesting that
official supervision can improve the efficient operation of banks. This contradicts
Barth et al. (2004), Delis et al. (2009), and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), who
found that supervision was not significant. This difference in finding may be explained
by the weak corporate governance standards and practices that characterize banks in
the GCC countries. Hence, a stronger role of the supervisor to monitor corruption, and
bad practices may compensate for weak corporate governance and improves efficiency
(Pasiouras et al., 2009; Chortareas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013).
Consistent with previous studies[32], the market discipline was found to be positive
and significant across all models. This finding suggests that improving the
information disclosure requirements will mitigate information asymmetry and
transaction costs and allow private agents to monitor banks more effectively which in
turn increase their operational efficiency. Similarly, a negative association between the
activity restriction variable and efficiency was recorded across all models. The lifting
of restrictions on bank activities and markets may have increased efficiency through
diversification, growth, and economies of scope. The result stands in line with the
empirical studies of Pasiouras et al. (2009), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010),
and Barth et al. (2013). Contradicting evidence was reported by Barth et al. (2004) and
Chortareas et al. (2012).
This paper proceeds to discuss the empirical results of control variables.
The government ownership effect on efficiency was found to be negative and significant.
This indicates that a higher proportion of government owned banks is bad for efficiency.
The result goes well with the general argument that government owned banks are
occasionally concernedwith national policy goals that may negatively influence efficiency.
Findings of the most previous empirical studies is consistent with the negative effect of
government ownership on efficiency, for instance see Pasiouras (2008a, b), Pasiouras et al.
(2009), Delis (2009), Delis et al. (2009), among others.
Regarding the foreign ownership variable we found a negative impact on bank
efficiency. A result that contradicts Havrylchyk (2006), Isik (2008), Pasiouras et al.
(2009), Delis (2009), but conforms well with Berger et al. (2000), Berger (2007),
Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) and Sufian (2011). Our result is consistent with the
home field advantage hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000), which pointed to the relative
weaknesses of foreign-owned banks due to cultural barriers, and the disadvantages of
distant monitoring and management. Another supporting story of our evidence is the
version of Weill (2003), who states that foreign banks are subject to substantial
information disadvantages compared to local banks. The managers of foreign banks
are exposed to substantial asymmetric information and adverse selection problems.
They lack the experience to deal with morale hazard, and they have less knowledge
about domestic markets and legal environment.
Turning to the bank-specific control variables, the size was found to be significant
at the 1 percent level. The associated parameters were negative at the levels and
positive at the squares. The inflection point for Model 1 of Table V was 3.64, above
which 67 percent of the size distribution lies. Because the sign of the parameter of the
quadratic term is positive, the estimated function is concave and rises upward
after the inflection point. This implies that larger banks are more efficient than
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smaller counterparts. However, the smaller banks are more likely to enjoy gains from
economies of scale.
As expected, we find that profitability is positively associated with efficiency. A
higher profitability enhances efficiency in accordance with Isik and Hassan (2003),
Fukuyama and Matousek (2011), Chortareas et al. (2013), and others. On the contrary,
the ratio of loans to total assets exhibits a negative relationship with bank efficiency;
however, the associated parameter is not significant at conventional levels. The book
value of equity to total assets exhibits a negative and statistically significant relationship
with bank efficiency. This lies broadly in line with the findings of Lozano-Vivas and
Pasiouras (2010), and Sufian (2011). It suggests that efficient banks, Ceteris Paribus,
use less equity. The finding is consistent with the argument that an increase in capital
equity reduces technical efficiency, due to higher costs. The coefficient associated with
diversification was also positive and significant. This finding is consistent with previous
studies on other countries (e.g. Cesari and Daltung, 2000; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Rossi et al.,
2009). It implies that diversification enhances efficiency through less idiosyncratic risk
and increased incentives to monitoring.
The effect of the economic environment was inconclusive. While the growth of GDP
does not appear to impact efficiency, the effect of inflation is negative and significant.
The inflation may increase labor price, interest rates, and asset prices, thereby
reducing bank efficiency. Finally, the dummy variable which was included to capture
the possible influence of the global financial crises during the period 2007-2009, was
found to be negative and significant.
6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature by testing the significance of
traditional determinants of bank efficiency in the GCC countries. The inference in this
study is conducted in two steps: measuring efficiency in the first step; regression
and inference on the determinants in the second step. Hence, in this paper we measure
efficiency using a recent double bootstrap methodology that yields more accurate
estimates than the non-parametric methods of Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker
et al. (1984) used in the most previous literature. Furthermore, our methodologies is one
step in measuring efficiency, and inferring its determinants, and hence, compared to
others who used two step methods, our results are more accurate, and free from
pre-test bias.
We found significant evidence that market power is associated with inefficient
banks. This conforms to the quiet life hypothesis of Hicks (1935), and to the threat of
liquidation hypothesis of Leibenstein (1966), but contradicts the Demsetz (1974)
efficient structure hypothesis. On the regulatory variables, there is compelling evidence
that a stringent capital requirement, a strong supervisory review, transparency, and
market discipline promote efficiency. However, the restrictions on bank activity were
found to reduce efficiency. These variables were not investigated before for the case of
GCC banks. However, the bulk of international evidence is consistent with these
findings except for a strong supervisory review. For instance, see Barth et al. (2004),
Pasiouras et al. (2009), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), and Barth et al. (2010) on
similar evidence on capital requirements and market discipline. The same work has
also provided a contradictory evidence of the supervisory review. These results point
that while the international evidence supports a lenient supervision to increase
efficiency, this may not be true in our case where a strong supervisory role proves to be
indispensable to promote efficiency in GCC banks.
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Furthermore, our results indicate that risk is negatively related to efficiency. Similar
empirical evidence on the relation between risk and efficiency was provided by Berger
and DeYoung (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Delis (2009), Sun and Chang (2011),
Fiordelisia et al. (2011), and Chortareas et al. (2011). These studies have pointed out the
negative influence of risk taking activities on bank efficiency. Finally, we found that
big, privately owned banks were more efficient. Foreign banks were also found to be
inefficient. These results support the home field advantage hypothesis of Berger et al.
(2000) as well as the information disadvantage hypothesis of Weill (2003).
The results of the current study have important implications for regulators and
supervisors. Promoting banks’ competitive environment in the GCC countries through
reducing the information barriers to entry, encouraging bank privatization, and
lowering the activities restrictions can potentially improve operational efficiency of
banks. Also enhancing banks’ diversification activities and risk management
techniques may have the advantage of increasing operational efficiency. Furthermore,
improvements in the regulatory conditions that enhance banking supervision and
monitoring would also improve efficiency. It is worth reiterating that we found that the
GCC banks experienced relative efficiency demolishes during the recent financial crises.
A possible policy conclusion from this result is that further enhancement in the regulatory
and supervisory framework would improve efficiency and increase stability of the
banking sectors in the GCC countries; just in case of any “bad luck” scenario occurred to
the global economy and spilled on the GCC.
Finally, we should note that our empirical work did not investigate the difference in
determinants of bank efficiency between Islamic and non-Islamic banks in the sample.
This might be an interesting topic to handle in the future. Moreover, the financial
meltdown in 2008 might have affected the nature of association and the empirical
findings and hence, pre-crisis and post-crisis investigation of the nature of association
is another area that could be approached in future research[33].
Notes
1. The GCC countries consist of the following countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.
2. See for example Mustafa (2007), Al-Muharrami (2007), Al-Tamimi and Lootah (2007),
Ramanathan, 2007, and Turk-Ariss et al. (2007).
3. In Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009), efficiency is measured non-parametrically in one
step, and then the inference is derived in a second step using regression techniques. Hence,
the inference in the second step depends on the accuracy with which efficiency is measured
in the first step.
4. The linear programming DEA measure is regressed on covariates in a truncated regression.
The results from this regression will provide the initial inputs to start the whole
procedure.
5. The supervisory power includes the degree of independence, the speed of corrective actions,
loan classifications and provisioning standards, and the diversification guidelines.
6. For more detail on these methods see Berger and Humphrey (1997); and Fethi and Pasiouras
(2010).
7. It is worth noting here that these two models yield exactly same values under Constant
Return to Scale, but not when Variable Returns to Scale is assumed (Thanassoulis, 2001).
8. More detailed can be found in Thanassoulis (2001) and Coelli et al. (2005).
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9. The efficiency estimate is bounded between 0 and 1. It is 1 if the bank lies on the frontier.
Note also that the optimization problem is solved once for each bank in the sample, giving
the efficiency score for each bank.
10. As efficiency is bounded by one, a truncated regression is suitable. The most commonly used
in related literature is the Tobit model. Other inference methods also exist, but these methods
suffer from severe draw backs and hence, considered inferior to the Tobit model (See Coelli
et al., 2005; and Simar and Wilson, 2007).
11. It should be worth noting here that that Maghyereh and Awartani (2012, 2014) used the same
procedure and sample to estimate bank efficiency in the GCC countries.
12. For more details see Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Fethi and Pasiouras (2010).
13. Berger and Humphrey (1997) point out that the production approach may be somewhat
better for evaluating the efficiencies of bank branches.
14. See Berger and Mester (1997); Hsiao et al. (2010); Halkos and Tzeremes (2013); among others.
15. Operational expenses net of personnel expenses is used as a proxy for capital expenses and
personnel expenses is used as a proxy for labor expenses.
16. As a measure of output, performing loans is a better indicator than total loans because only
performing loans contribute to the revenue of banks (Ray and Das, 2010).
17. Off-balance sheet activities would be more appropriate to measure non-traditional activities.
However, BankScope does not include comprehensive information on the off-balance sheet
activities for the GCC countries.
18. See Table II for a summary of the variables.
19. Maghyereh and Awartani (2013) used the exact procedure to estimate market power of GCC
banks over the period 2001-2011.
20. A better measurement of labor price is the ratio of personnel expense to the number of bank
employees. Unfortunately, BankScope does not include comprehensive information on the
number of bank employees for the GCC countries.
21. We correct for simultaneity bias by using instrumental variables.
22. The number of questions that describe the capital requirement, the power of supervisory
agencies, the market discipline and the restriction on activity indices is nine, 14, 10, and 16,
respectively. Hence, the capital requirement may assume values from 0 to 9, the power of the
supervisory agencies from 0 to 14, the market discipline from 0 to 10, and finally the activity
restrictions from 0 to 16.
23. Another version of the Z-Score that incorporates temporal changes may be written as:
ROAit þ CAPit
ROAit  ROAi
 
The results using this version were not any different, and so were not reported in the paper.
24. These variables were selected on the basis previous empirical studies on determinants of
banks’ efficiency and of data availability.
25. An alternative measure of capital adequacy ratio is the capital to risk weighted assets
(CRAR). Unfortunately, BankScope does not include a comprehensive information on the
CRAR of the GCC countries. Furthermore, capital adequacy variable is included as
explanatory variable not as an input measure in the DEA as it occasionly influence banks’
risk profiles and the extent of their risk-taking activities.
26. IBCA stands for the International Bank of Credit Analysis Ltd.
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27. The World Bank databases includes three versions: the 2001 version, the 2003 version and
the 2007 version. The data are available at: http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0
28. The bootstrap estimates were computed using 2000 replications.
29. Inflationary pressures have emerged since 2004 in all of the GCC countries. The sharp
increases in oil prices, the peg to the weakening US dollar, the global shocks related to high
food prices, and the local supply shortages related to rents have fueled the inflation figures.
The average inflation for the whole of the GCC has increased from 1.7 percent in 2003 to
8 percent in 2007.
30. During this period, the GCC banking sectors have invested heavily in advanced technologies
such as ATMs, credit and debit cards, points of sale networks, home banking, telephone
banking and online banking (for more details see Srairi, 2010).
31. See VanHoose (2007) for a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on the effect of
capital requirements on banks behavior.
32. This conclusion is consistent with what was reported by Barth et al. (2004, 2006), Pasiouras
(2008a, b), Delis et al. (2009), Barth et al. (2007), Pasiouras et al. (2009), Uchida and Satake
(2009), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), and Barth et al. (2013).
33. This idea has been suggested to us thankfully by one of the referees 8. More detailed can be
found in Thanassoulis (2001) and Coelli et al. (2005).
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